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This paper proposes a simple multi-industry trade model with search frictions in
the labor market. Unimpeded access to global ﬁnancial markets enables capital
owners to invest abroad, thereby fostering unemployment at the extensive indus-
try margin. Whether a country beneﬁts from FDI in terms of unemployment de-
pends on the respective country’s net-FDI, measured as the difference between
in- and outward FDI. The derived FDI and unemployment nexus is tested employ-
ing macroeconomic data for 19 OECD countries on unemployment, FDI, and labor
market institutions. Results support the model in that net-FDI is robustly associated
with lower rates of aggregate unemployment.
Zusammenfassung
Diese Arbeit präsentiert ein einfaches Mehrsektoren-Außenhandelsmodell mit Such-
friktionen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt. Der ungehinderte Zugang zum weltweiten Ka-
pitalmarkt ermöglicht Kapitaleignern mittels FDI im Ausland zu investieren. Dies
hat einen Einﬂuss auf die Arbeitsnachfrage am extensiven (Branchen-)Rand und
auf die aggregierte Arbeitslosenrate einer Ökonomie. Inwieweit die Arbeitslosen-
rate in einem Land positiv oder negativ beeinﬂusst wird, hängt von den ausländi-
schen Netto-Direktinvestitionen ab, gemessen durch die Differenz der Kapitalim-
und exporte. Dieser aus dem Modell abgeleitete Zusammenhang von ausländi-
schen Direktinvestitionen und Arbeitslosigkeit wird anhand makroökonomischer
Daten für 19 OECD Länder getestet. Die Daten enthalten Informationen über Ar-
beitslosenquote, ausländischen Direktinvestitionen und Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen
der verschiedenen Länder. Im Einklang mit den theoretischen Ergebnissen lässt
sich empirisch zeigen, dass ausländische Netto-Direktinvestitionen mit einer nied-
rigeren, aggregierten Arbeitslosenrate verbunden sind.
JEL classiﬁcation: F16, E24, J6, F21
Keywords: FDI, search unemployment, labor market institutions
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The ongoing internationalization of product and labor markets has stimulated a
lively debate about the pros and cons of globalization. Supporters often stress the
beneﬁcial effects that arise due to increased export opportunities, whereas glob-
alization’s detractors are usually more concerned about job losses due to height-
ened competition from so-called low-income countries. Economics can contribute
to this debate in that it can rationalize the fear that more intensive global economic-
interdependency generates by identifying the merits and downsides of this process
and by quantifying the labor market outcomes of the potentially opposing effects.
The public debate that surrounds these issues has frequently been characterized
by a lack of clarity regarding the deﬁnition of globalization and a failure to account
for different elements of this process which may have contrasting implications for
domestic and international labor markets. In this paper we devote our attention
to the implications of capital mobility for domestic and international labor markets
by proposing an empirical test on the FDI and unemployment nexus. The test is
based on a simple multi-industry model with unemployment due to search frictions.
Integrated capital markets facilitate the study of foreign direct investment and its
effects on equilibrium unemployment. The outcome of the model is different from
previous studies in that the effect is ex-ante ambiguous and highly depends on
whether a country is the FDI receiving or sending country.
The intuition behind that result is that FDI directly affects intermediates (labor) de-
mand at the extensive margin through endogenous adjustments of capital costs.
The adjustments in production costs trigger an expansion of the FDI receiving
country’s range of active industries through the increased competitiveness in in-
dustries located close to the former cutoff. This boosts demand for intermediates
and thus reduces equilibrium unemployment.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst focusing on the unemployment
effects of global sourcing in a model with a continuum of industries from both an
empirical and a theoretical perspective. Lin and Wang (2008) present empirical
evidence on the effects of capital-outﬂows on equilibrium unemployment, but their
analysis does not feature the distinction between inward and outward FDI. This
distinction is crucial at least in the model presented in the theory section of this
paper where we show that the sign of the effect is different depending on whether
a country is the receiving or the sending country. The same empirical strategy
as proposed by Dutt, Mitra and Ranjan (2009), or Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer
(2011 b) was used to shed light on the FDI and unemployment nexus.
Also closely related to this paper are two contributions by Mitra and Ranjan (2007)
and Davidson, Matusz and Schevchenko (2008) both focusing on the employment
effects of outsourcing in trade models with search frictions. Mitra and Ranjan
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outsourcing decreases equilibrium unemployment. Outsourcing in Davidson et al.
(2008) forces some of the high skill workers in the North to search for jobs in the
low skill sector. This stirs up job competition in the low skill sector and thus triggers
a rise in unemployment.
Kohler and Wrona (2010) highlight the existence of a non-monotonicity between
offshoring and unemployment. They identify channels through which offshoring
can affect demand for intermediates at the intensive and extensive margin. The
two opposing effects lead to an outcome where the sign of the effect hinges on
the level of offshoring. Also closely related is an emerging literature on the labor
market effects of globalization. Brecher’s (1974) seminal paper about the labor
market effects of a minimum wage in the Heckscher Ohlin model can be seen as a
foundation for a large and emerging literature about the employment effects of glob-
alization. Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1988, 1999) incorporated the Pissarides
search and matching framework into a Heckscher Ohlin type of trade model. Moore
and Ranjan (2005) investigate the link between trade liberalization and skill-speciﬁc
unemployment in such an extended Heckscher Ohlin framework. More recently the
spotlight has been directed towards the popular Melitz (2003) international trade
model. Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) show how rent-sharing with heterogeneous
ﬁrms that pay fair wages helps to explain the residual wage inequality and the so-
called exporter wage premium. Trade liberalization in their approach increases
wage inequality. Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) and Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer
(2011 a) analyze potential employment effects in a heterogeneous ﬁrms model with
search frictions. Based on their earlier study, Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2010
a,b) investigate the effects of globalization on wage inequality and unemployment
when workers and ﬁrms are heterogeneous.
2 Theory
The model employed to study potential labor market effects of FDI is an extended
version of the Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997) general equilibrium trade model
with search friction a là Pissarides (2000) in the labor market. One modiﬁcation
of the original Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997) model is that the production
of the continuum of ﬁnal consumption goods takes place on two different levels.
Final goods are assembled using intermediate inputs and capital within each in-
dustry. Intermediates are produced by input of homogeneous labor only, which
is a simpliﬁcation of the original model that distinguishes between high- and low-
skill workers. The main contribution to the literature is the micro-foundation of the
wage-setting mechanism through search and matching and wage negotiation be-
tween employers and employees. Firms have to post vacancies in order to recruit
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negotiation the ﬁrm sets up shop and starts producing the intermediate good. The
modeling of search frictions is based on the simpler Pissarides (2000) version of
the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) search and matching framework. Interme-
diates are produced by small ﬁrms so that each intermediate good producer hires
exactly one worker and produces one unit of the intermediate good. Wages, goods
prices, and thus world income is jointly determined in general equilibrium, which
creates an interdependency between the ﬁnal- and the intermediate goods produc-
ers. Put differently, wages paid to workers producing the intermediates map into
intermediate goods prices, which implicitly determines the price of the ﬁnal good.
2.1 The model
Consumer demand. Following the lines proposed in Dornbusch, Fischer and
Samuelson (1977), or Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997) we assume that the
whole continuum of goods is consumed by a representative household according
to a Cobb-Douglas preferences function
ln Y =
Z 1
0
'(z)lnx(z)dz ; (1)
where x(z) is the quantity of the good from industry z consumed and '(z) is the
Cobb Douglas share.1 Aggregate demand evaluated by the price P must equal
total expenditure Y P = E. Perfect competition and homothetic preferences im-
plies that a fraction '(z) of world expenditure is spent on consumption of good z.
Demand is thus determined by
x(z) =
'(z)E
(z)
; (2)
which relates expenditure and revenue within industry z. Perfect competition im-
plies that revenue in industry z equals quantity times unit costs, (z), so that the
consumption and production side of the model is interacted through (2).
Final good producers. Intermediates are assembled to ﬁnal goods within indus-
tries z. The assembling process requires capital provided by capital owners for
some interest r. Industries are ordered according to the input coefﬁcients a(z),
which exogenously determine the requirement of intermediates needed to produce
one unit of the consumption good z. Both countries specialize their production to
certain industries with a comparative advantage by means of lower unit costs. In-
put coefﬁcients in z are exogenously given by Ricardian technology parameters in
1 Summing up the shares over the whole continuum of industries must equal unity.
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ai(z) = i + i(z) ; (3)
where index i denotes domestic (d) or foreign (f). The labor requirement curves
comprise a country-speciﬁc component  and an industry-speciﬁc component 
that varies over the continuum. As in Dornbusch et al. (1977) technology differ-
ences across countries are necessary to derive a clear trade pattern according to
each country’s comparative advantage.2
To model ﬁnal good production we postulate a Cobb Douglas production function
xi(z) = [ai(z)]
 [ki(z)]
1  ; (4)
where ai(z) denotes the amount of intermediates used in industry z and ki(z) de-
notes capital needed to assemble the ﬁnal good z. The ﬁnal industry output good is
sold for a price p(z). Perfect competition implies that the industry price level equals
the respective industry unit costs
pi(z) = i(z) = B(qiai(z))
r
1 
i ; (5)
where (z) denotes minimum unit costs in sector z obtained by solving the cost
minimization problem of the ﬁrm. Cost depend on prices paid for the intermediate
inputs, qi, and capital rental, r. B =  (1   ) (1 ) and ai(z) are given exoge-
nously.
Wages are determined on the intermediate producer level and thus equalized across
industries. Final good producers take prices charged by intermediate good produc-
ers as given and adjust their demand for intermediates based on the price q (in
common units) charged for one intermediate good.
Intermediate input producers. The small intermediate good producers have to
post vacancies in order to recruit new employees which incurs vacancy posting
costs c prior to a successful match. To solve the general equilibrium of the model
we assume that vacancy posting costs are paid in terms of intermediate prices.3
The matching process m(i) is a concave function of , the equilibrium market
tightness. Due to its constant returns to scale properties, the matching function
implicitly determines the probability of a successful match. The problem of the ﬁrm
2 Another approach close to the Dornbusch et al. (1977) model is Eaton and Kortum (2002) where
countries draw their productivity parameter from a country-speciﬁc distribution. Using equation
(3) instead allows us to determine a clear industry ranking that facilitates extensions such as
mine.
3 This assumption is in line with Pissarides (2000).
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revenue, unemployment beneﬁts b, the bargaining power , vacancy posting costs
c, the discount rate , and job destruction rate . The solution to the problem of the
worker and the ﬁrm is derived as in Pissarides (2000) or Dutt et al. (2009). See the
appendix for a detailed solution.
Lemma 1. a) To derive a unique solution for intermediate goods’ prices, q, the
wage and job creation curves are interacted and solved as
qi =
(1   )bi
(1   )   c(i +
+
m(i))
(6)
b) Wages, and thus intermediate good prices, are increasing in i since
@q
@i > 0.
Proof. We can exploit
@m(i)
@i < 0 in order to show that
@qi
@i > 0. The higher the
vacancy to unemployment ratio, i, the higher must be the equilibrium wage rate
in order to attract enough workers to ﬁll the vacancies. Higher wages in turn are
linked to higher intermediate good prices paid by ﬁnal good assemblers.
Labor market clearing. The existence of search frictions in the labor market
gives rise to a situation where ﬁrms adjust their demand for intermediates (labor)
to the intermediate input prices depending on wages and search costs. Perfect
competition in context of search frictions implies that an intermediate good’s price
comprises production and the ﬁrm’s expected recruitment costs, that depend on
the probability of a successful vacancy-post.
Final good assemblers are price-takers. Firms base the decision about their de-
mand for intermediates on the intermediate input goods prices set by the intermedi-
ate goods producers. Using Shephard’s lemma, demand for intermediates solves
@i(q;r;z)
@qi(z)
= Bai(z)(qiai(z))
 1r
1 
i : (7)
The economy’s total labor demand can be found by aggregating industry labor
demand over the whole continuum of active industries as
Li(1   ui(i)) =
Z  zi
z
¯
i
B

ri
qiai(z)
1 
ai(z)xi(z)dz ; (8)
where  zi and z
¯
i represents the upper and lower bound of the respective country’s
competitive industries. Search frictions give rise to unemployment, which is de-
termined by the Beveridge curve that secures that ﬂows into unemployment equal
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cave translates into a convex Beveridge curve so that
@ui(i)
@i < 0. Intermediate
goods’ prices q are determined on the intermediate goods level of the model and
depend on the equilibrium market tightness. Equation (2) allows us to simplify the
Labor Market Condition (LMC) such that the equilibrium depends only on the en-
dogenous parameters z and i as well as other exogenous parameters and reads
as
Li(1   ui(i)) =
Z  zi
z
¯
i

'(z)E
n
(1   )   c(i +
+
m(i)
o
f(1   )big
dz : (9)
The standard Pissarides (2000) assumption that each ﬁrm employs one worker
links ﬁnal good producers’ demand for intermediates and intermediate good pro-
ducers labor demand (equal to the number of ﬁrms) according to equation (9). The
specialization pattern under free trade is ex-ante unknown and depends on the
unit cost schedule over all industries. The mass of one single industry is zero in
the continuous scenario. A sensible interpretation therefore demands the compu-
tation of the mass of a certain range of industries within the whole continuum. The
consumption share for industry output in z is constant and equalized over the whole
continuum, which allows us to solve the integral in (9).
Lemma 2. Labor markets are in equilibrium if labor demand equals labor supply.
The LMC conditions therefore pin down equilibrium market tightness, wages, and
unemployment. The equilibrium is well-deﬁned as there exists a unique combina-
tion of home and foreign market tightness such that both LMC curves are fulﬁlled
given the cutoff z.
Proof. Let  L denote the left,  R the right hand side of the labor market clearing
condition. The left hand side of both conditions has its origin in zero and converges
to an upper bound. The intuition is the following. Let i go towards zero. Wages
would approach zero, whereas unemployment would go towards inﬁnity such that
the left hand side of the LMC curve has its origin in zero and converges towards
full employment. The right hand side is also well behaved. Labor demand is pos-
itive for i approaching zero and decreases in i. An increase in i triggers an
increase in intermediate input goods’ prices, which in turn reduces demand for the
intermediates. Thus, there is a unique solution for the LMC curve determined by
the intersection of  L and  R.
2.2 General Equilibrium
The general equilibrium requires a framework that pins down the endogenous pa-
rameters. To close the model income is normalized to unity and determined by
IAB-Discussion Paper 04/2012 10adding up world factor payments to workers in and outside the pool of unemployed,
which is given by
E = Ld(1   ud)qd + rdKd + Lf(1   uf)qf + rfKf : (10)
Capital rentals are determined using the Cobb Douglas shares and the capital mar-
ket clearing conditions
rdKd =
1   

Ld(1   ud)qd ; (11)
rfKf =
1   

Lf(1   uf)qf : (12)
Interest rates are such that capital markets are in equilibrium, conditional on si-
multaneous goods and labor market clearing. The equilibrium then depends on
six endogenous variables: one home- and one foreign- market tightness, capital
rentals in the foreign- and the home country, one cutoff that pins down the trade
pattern between both countries, and income. Without loss of generality we can set
world income as nummeraire by normalizing it to unity. A closed form solution of
the model requires a determination of the optimal trade pattern between both coun-
tries. This trade pattern also determines the amount of capital required to produce
for both home and foreign demand of ﬁnal goods produced within active industries.
Corollary 1. The trade pattern between both countries hinges on one unique cutoff
z 2 (0;1) satisfying
pd(z
) = pf(z
) , d(d;z
) = f(d;z
) : (13)
The pattern of trade depends on the country’s comparative advantage. The fact
that ﬁnal good producers are price takers in addition to the result that intermediate
good’s prices and capital costs are equalized within but different across countries
allows us to determine a cutoff industry for which both industries produce with same
unit-costs. For a given equilibrium market tightness and a given capital rental the
pattern of trade is solely determined by the Ricaridian differences in technology.
However, the micro-foundation of the wage setting mechanism and endogenous
interest rates imply that countries can gain or loose a comparative advantage within
certain industries if wages or capital cost change. A comparisons of unit costs is
sufﬁcient to determine the optimal comparative advantage pattern across countries.
The clear ordering of the continuum of industries according to intermediate goods
requirements allows to solve the cutoff industry z. In a two-country scenario one
country supports demand for goods from industries in the continuum z 2 [0;z]
and the other country supplies goods from z 2 [z;1].
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The unimpeded access to foreign ﬁnancial markets allows capital owners to in-
vest their capital in markets with the highest returns to capital. The model and the
comparative static exercise conducted below thereby totally neglect the role of the
government. Instead we focus on an initial scenario with frictionless capital mar-
kets but unequal capital rentals in the two countries studied. Starting from that ini-
tial disequilibrium we analyze how footloose capital-ﬂows triggered by differences
in international capital returns affect equilibrium unemployment. The adjustment
process goes through the endogenous change in capital rentals, which inﬂuences
production costs and thus the comparative advantage pattern across industries.
The effects of FDI on equilibrium market tightness. FDI in the form of capital
inﬂows and outﬂows necessarily induce interest rate readjustments so that the cap-
ital clearing conditions are in equilibrium again. Capital inﬂows for instance reduce
the scarcity of capital and thus precipitate a reduction in interest rates, which has a
decreasing effect on unit costs. Given that all other factor prices remain constant,
the unit cost function shifts down associated with lower ﬁnal good prices over the
whole continuum. The opposite happens in the country that looses capital. Sup-
pose that capital ﬂows from Foreign to Home. Interest rates in the receiving Home
country decrease, interest rates at Foreign increase.
Suppose that z pins down the FDI receiving country’s upper, and the sending
country’s lower bound of active industries. The initial trade pattern is no longer
optimal and the new intersection of the domestic and the foreign unit cost sched-
ules is pinned down by z0 > z. The range of active industries contracts in the
FDI-out economy and expands in the FDI-in economy. This implies that the former
labor market equilibrium is not optimal any more: unemployment, wages and the
equilibrium market tightness have to adjust.
In the following we distinguish between the adjustments at the extensive and inten-
sive margin. At the extensive margin some industries get lost, which gives rise to
a reduction in labor demand on the aggregate level. At the same time the adjust-
ments of capital costs also directly affect the equilibrium by triggering a substitution
between capital and labor.
Proposition 1. FDI outﬂows result in capital cost adjustments. Firms’ labor de-
mand increases at the intensive margin due to higher capital costs triggering a
substitution effect. At the extensive margin the increase in the cutoff destroys all
jobs associated with industries formerly belonging to the sending country. The op-
posite pattern applies for the FDI-receiving country. To restore the labor market
equilibrium,  must increase in the receiving and decrease in the sending country.
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the LMC curve with respect to the cutoff z, which is positive for the receiving and
negative for the sending country, translating into job creation (FDI-in country) and
job destruction (FDI-out country) at the extensive margin. Note that the distinction
between the case where z is the upper or the lower bound of active industries is
crucial. Suppose for instance that Home’s lower bound of active industries is ﬁxed
at  zd = 0 due to the better technology in that corner industry. It follows immediately
that z is Home’s variable upper bound of active industries which adjusts endoge-
nously. An expansion of the range of active industries at Home would be indicated
by a an increase in z. The derivative of  R with respect to z is positive if the ﬁxed
bound of the respective country is the lower bound of the mass of industries and
it is negative if the ﬁxed bound of the range of industries is the upper bound of the
mass of industries. The same logic can be applied for the foreign country where z
is the lower bound of active industries and z
¯
f = 1 is the ﬁxed upper bound so that
the ﬁrst derivative of  R with respect to z would be negative at Foreign.
In order to restore equilibrium labor supply must adjust too. Since labor demand in
the FDI-out country decreases at the extensive margin, a higher rate of unemploy-
ment is needed to restore equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium market tightness must
fall, wages go down and unemployment goes up. This in turn boosts labor demand
on the individual industry level and strengthens the increase in labor demand on
the intensive margin. Income adjustments do not matter in my setup since income
is set as nummeraire. A formal proof can be found in the Appendix.
3 Empirical evidence
For the second part of this study, data from Bassanini and Duval (2009) and the
UNCDAT is used to test the main implications of the model presented in the theory
section. More precisely, the crucial result is that international capital mobility can
feed back into different labor market outcomes. The availability of measures on
FDI, unemployment and labor market institutions facilitate the analysis of the FDI
and unemployment relationship sketched above, where inward- and outward-FDI
have different effects on unemployment. The test itself is based on panel data for
19 OECD countries.
The opposing effects of in- and outward FDI are tested exploiting the information
on FDI-net stocks, constructed as difference between FDI-in and FDI-out relative
to GDP. We include the net-FDI measures in unemployment regressions where we
control for other potential unemployment-drivers as institutions and ﬂuctuations in
the business cycle. The expected sign of the FDI coefﬁcient is negative. Exploiting
only the within variation of the data by including the whole set of country dum-
mies we are able to show that a net-increase in capital-imports is associated with
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concerns. Firstly, unemployment ﬂuctuates with the business cycle and the results
are biased due to omitted variables that have also an effect on unemployment. The
ﬁrst issue is addressed by the inclusion of controls for the output gap constructed
as difference between actual and potential GDP. Five-year averages were taken
in a second step in order to purge short run ﬂuctuations from the data. The sec-
ond issue is more involved and addressed by including various control variables
that capture the degree of labor and product market regulations, as well as dummy
variables to control for country and time speciﬁc effects. Second, the regression
may be plagued by endogeneity between the globalization measures and unem-
ployment. A surge in unemployment can foster protectionism, which feeds back
into lower FDI. The panel dimension of the data allows to tackle endogeneity by
treating FDI as endogenous in GMM-regressions.4
The empirical setup is borrowed from Felbermayr et al. (2011 b) or Dutt et al.
(2009) both focusing on unemployment effects of globalization in cross-country
regressions.
3.1 Empirical strategy and data
Empirical strategy. Inspired by numerous labor market studies that analyze the
effects of institutional changes on labor market outcomes we estimate a linear
model with total unemployment as the dependent variable in order to confront
Proposition 1 with data. The model we are going to estimate is
uit =  +   FDIit + 1  LABit + 2  CONit + i + !t + it ; (14)
where uit is total unemployment in country i at time t,  is a constant, and FDI
is the variable of interest measuring FDI-net intensity as the difference between
in- and outward FDI relative to GDP. The vector LAB contains various labor mar-
ket institutional variables, where the OECD provide measures on the replacement
rate, the tax wedge, employment protection, and union density. Additional control
variables captured by CON include product market regulations, portfolio invest-
ments, and the output gap to cope with short run ﬂuctuations. The panel structure
of the data facilitates purging the regressions of country and time invariant effects
by including dummy variables  and !.
The preferred estimator is a consistent ﬁxed effects estimator including additional
time dummies to control for trends common to all countries. To show that the
4 The requirement on diff-GMM regressions are rather demanding and not always fulﬁlled. Several
test statistics permit the evaluation of the GMM results. Sys-GMM results are not presented
since it produces instruments that are not valid due to the over identiﬁcation problem. Additional
Anderson and Hsiao (1981, 1982) results are available upon request.
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feasible least square models are employed. In a last step, endogeneity is ad-
dressed employing a diff-GMM estimator that treats FDI as endogenous variable.
Endogeneity concerns arise from the isolationist sentiments that stem from the per-
ceived negative labor market effects of globalization. Such a negative perception
may provoke protectionist tendencies which have to be taken into consideration
during the analysis.
Generally speaking, the dimension of the data necessitates ﬁve-year averages in
order to run diff-GMM regressions, which reduces the impact of short run ﬂuctu-
ations. The construction of valid instruments usually requires a cross-sectional
dimension that is larger than the time-dimension. This requirement is obviously
not fulﬁlled by the original Bassanini and Duval data set. Without taking ﬁve-year
averages the data covers observations for 20 OECD countries in the period 1980 -
2003. Five-year averages ease this problem by reducing the number of instruments
and structural breaks in the data.
Data. To bring the model to the data we use measures from the OECD, UNCDAT,
and WDI. The dependent variable is OECD total unemployment including 15 - 64
years old male and female observations. The variable of interest is FDI-net stocks
constructed using measures on in- and outward FDI from the UNCDAT database.
FDI-net is measured as the difference between in- and outward-FDI relative to
GDP. FDI includes transactions of ﬁrms from foreign countries holding a share of
at least 10% in a domestic company. Inward FDI is an investment from abroad in
the reporting country, whereas FDI-out measures FDI from the reporting country to
the rest of the world. Both are measured in current U.S. dollars. Comparability be-
tween different countries with different size is introduced through the construction
of FDI-net intensities. Portfolio investment assets and real openness, both in U.S.
dollars relative to GDP, are included as additional control variables to proxy ﬁnan-
cial integration and globalization, where the data was taken from the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
Various indices on labor market institutions available through the OECD were ex-
ploited to reduce the omitted variable bias caused by other unemployment-drivers.
Bassanini and Duval provide and discuss a data set that contains the most impor-
tant variables. We control for tax wedge, replacement rate, employment protection
(EPL), and union density5. Unfortunately the OECD stopped updating those vari-
ables so that labor market institutions are available for the period 1980 - 2003 only,
which is also determining the time dimension in our sample. An output gap mea-
5 Constain and Reiter (2008) propose to include wage distortion as sum of the replacement rate
and tax wedge. The results remain qualitatively unchanged and are available upon request.
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variable bias from the regressions.
3.2 Results
Proposition (1) translates into a predicted negative sign of the net-FDI coefﬁcient
when regressing it upon unemployment.
The intuition behind this expected sign is that a negative coefﬁcient indicates that a
surge in net-FDI is negatively associated with unemployment. This result would be
in line with proposition (1) where the reallocation of industries causes job creation
in the FDI-receiving and job destruction in the FDI-sending country. The regression
results are in line with proposition (1).
Benchmark results. Table (1) presents the benchmark regression results for the
consistent ﬁxed effects estimator. In a ﬁrst step, the full set of available observa-
tions is employed without averaging the data, which leaves us more than 400 ob-
servations for 19 OECD countries between 1980-2003. Regression (I) is the most
parsimonious setup with a focus on the ﬁnancial market integration measure FDI,
which is the variable of interest in all regressions. As controls we include country
and time dummies, as well as the output gap. The results indicate a signiﬁcant and
negative relationship between net-FDI and unemployment. The magnitude of the
effect is rather strong and likely reﬂects a spurious correlation driven by the varia-
tion in the business cycle and the mentioned omitted variable bias. Another strand
of the labor market literature already demonstrated the importance of including
globalization controls that capture real trade ﬂows6. We therefore extend our setup
by a total trade openness measure in regression (II). The FDI coefﬁcient drops from
-0.4 to -0.3. Regression (III) ﬁnally includes the whole set of globalization controls
as portfolio-investment, total-trade openness, and net-FDI.
Sign and signiﬁcance remain and even the magnitude is rather stable. In a sub-
sequent step we shed light on the role of labor market institutions in context of
foreign direct investment. Regression (V) includes institutional measures on the
degree of employment protection (EPL), the union density capturing the bargaining
power of unions, the replacement rate and the tax wedge, as well as the output
6 We experimented with different openness measures in our related empirical work, whereas Dutt
et al. (2009) used different tariff measures in their cross-sectional regression setup.
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Dependent variable: Total unemployment
Variable of interest: FDI-net (FDI-in minus FDI-out relative to GDP)
I II III IV V VI
FE FE FE FE FE FE
FDI-net −0.041∗∗ −0.030∗∗ −0.029∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗ −0.033∗ −0.026
(0.019) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023)
Openness −0.156∗∗∗ −0.131∗∗ −0.151∗∗ −0.128∗
(0.046) (0.058) (0.058) (0.064)
Portfolio investments −0.145 −0.005 0.186
(0.115) (0.156) (0.134)
Replacement rate −0.031 −0.025 −0.053
(0.043) (0.050) (0.043)
Tax wedge 0.315∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗ 0.145∗
(0.098) (0.112) (0.080)
EPL −1.281 −1.182 −1.281
(1.384) (1.400) (1.031)
Union density −0.055 0.001 −0.007
(0.064) (0.061) (0.063)
PMR 0.297 0.636 0.659
(0.618) (0.644) (0.576)
Real interest rate (shock) 0.219∗
(0.113)
TFP (shock) 36.168∗∗∗
(6.084)
ToT (shock) 11.165
(8.769)
LD (shock) 9.122
(6.354)
Output gap −0.566∗∗∗ −0.552∗∗∗ −0.577∗∗∗ −0.616∗∗∗ −0.591∗∗∗ −0.786∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.087) (0.085) (0.061) (0.055) (0.060)
R-square 0.509 0.578 0.584 0.594 0.663 0.730
N 456 456 428 386 368 338
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, *** signiﬁcant at
1%. Data is available for 19 OECD countries. Time dummies included in all regressions. Real total
trade openness included in (II), (III), (V), and (VI)
gap and product market regulations. We extend regression (I) so that all globaliza-
tion controls other than the variable of interest are excluded again. The magnitude
of the effect is slightly higher than that in regression (I) which can be due to the
loss of observations7. As before the magnitude of the effect declines signiﬁcantly
when we also include openness and portfolio investment controls. However, la-
bor market institutions have less explanatory power as indicated by the modest
decline in R-square and the rather weak decrease in the coefﬁcients of the other
7 Unfortunately the institutional variables contain missings.
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for the output gap and FDI are higher when the labor market institution controls
are included. In regression (VI) all controls and additional macroeconomic shocks
are included which yields insigniﬁcant results for net-FDI. However, interestingly
we also ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for the real interest rate shock.
This result is in line with the theory that suggests that capital costs are a potential
channel variable between FDI and unemployment. Higher capital rentals trigger
FDI-ﬂows, thereby fostering unemployment.
To summarize the benchmark regression results based on the entire information
available, without averaging the data, we ﬁnd negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcients
for net-FDI in almost all regressions. Openness conﬁrms the results found in our
companion paper and in Dutt et al. (2010). Portfolio investment is less robust and
becomes insigniﬁcant once we control for the business cycle.
Moreover, FDI and openness explain much of the relationship between FDI and
unemployment compared to the standard variables as institutions and ﬂuctuations
in the business cycle. The inclusion of macroeconomic shocks destroys signiﬁ-
cance but in line with our story we ﬁnd positive and signiﬁcant sign for the interest
rate shock. This is a potential explanation for the loss in signiﬁcance of the FDI
measure. To demonstrate the robustness of those ﬁndings we go one step further
by taking ﬁve-year averages of the data in the next paragraph. This procedure
facilitates GMM regressions and it reduces the impact of the business cycle by
smoothing ﬂuctuations from the data.
Taking ﬁve-year averages of the data. We already discussed the problems
caused by relatively long time dimension of the data used. Taking ﬁve year aver-
ages improves the test statistics of the GMM regressions and reduces the omitted
variable bias caused by the business cycle. The comparison of the Sargan test
statistics obtained from a GMM model based on an averaged version of the data
with the outcome of the same model based on non-averaged data conﬁrms our
suspicion. The non-averaged data yields a p-value exactly equal to zero, which is
in stark contrast to the test statistics reported in Table (2). Put differently taking
ﬁve-year averages improves the quality of the instruments as expected. But before
we turn to the detailed discussion of the GMM-results we ﬁrst rerun the benchmark
ﬁxed effects regressions from Table (1).
Regression (I) replicates regression (I) from Table (1) in that only the net-FDI, as
well as the output gap and time dummies are included. The results indicate that
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Dependent variable: Total unemployment
Variable of interest: FDI-net (FDI-in minus FDI-out relative to GDP)
I II III IV V VI
FE FE FE DIFF-GMM DIFF-GMM FGLS
FDI-net −0.039∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.037∗ −0.113∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗
(0.019) (0.014) (0.020) (0.057) (0.052) (0.015)
Openness −0.175∗∗ −0.438∗∗∗ −0.265∗ −0.198∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.135) (0.135) (0.038)
Portfolio investment 0.153 1.879∗∗ 1.619∗∗ 0.117
(0.257) (0.785) (0.650) (0.206)
Lag. dep. var. 0.594∗∗∗ 0.465∗
(0.226) (0.281)
Replacement rate −0.034 −0.030 −0.109∗ −0.099 −0.010
(0.046) (0.057) (0.063) (0.062) (0.026)
Tax wedge 0.376∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗ 0.063 0.165 0.205∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.121) (0.105) (0.110) (0.064)
EPL −0.890 −0.938 −0.389 −0.842 −0.817
(1.356) (1.497) (1.237) (1.179) (0.511)
Union density −0.069 −0.035 −0.062 −0.139∗∗ −0.029
(0.056) (0.057) (0.060) (0.062) (0.034)
PMR 0.431 0.702 0.114 0.149 0.887∗∗∗
(0.645) (0.735) (0.705) (0.691) (0.286)
Output gap −0.710∗∗∗ −0.649∗∗∗ −0.616∗∗∗ −1.201∗∗∗ −1.199∗∗∗ −0.637∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.093) (0.078) (0.224) (0.226) (0.064)
R-square 0.513 0.608 0.673
AR (1) . . . 0.034 0.076 .
AR (2) . . . 0.407 0.197 .
Sargan OID-test . . . 0.677 0.360 .
N 96 93 90 70 70 90
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *signiﬁcant at 10%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, *** signiﬁcant at
1%. Data is available for 19 OECD countries. Time dummies included in all regressions. Fixed
eﬀects preferred for the benchmark speciﬁcation according to the Hausman test. In (IV) we treat
openness, output gap, and net-FDI as endogenous. In (V) we exclude openness from the set of
endogenous regressors but treat FDI-net and output gap as endogenous.
a one standard deviation increase in net-FDI reduces unemployment by roughly
0.8 percentage points. Regression (II) includes the institutional controls which in-
creases the magnitude of the effect to a 1 percentage point reduction in a one
standard deviation of net-FDI. Controlling for ﬁnancial integration and openness
yields results which are very much in line with (II). We then devote attention to the
endogeneity problem in that we generate instruments using lagged variables of
the potentially endogenous regressors in a diff-GMM regression setup. The model
in (IV) treats net-FDI, the output gap, and openness as endogenous. The perfor-
mance of the instruments is rather good compared to the results obtained for the
non-averaged data. The test on ﬁrst and second order autocorrelation between the
instruments and the error term yields p-values equal to 0.037 and 0.417, and the
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behind the endogeneity problem is that policy makers could be inﬂuenced by a
surge in unemployment. This could encourage them to increase barriers to inter-
national capital and trade ﬂows so that trade openness is also a potential sources
for endogeneity. Regression (V) excludes openness from the set of endogenous
regressors as a robustness check. All setups yield the same robust ﬁnding. FDI-
net and openness is negative and signiﬁcant supporting the robustness of our main
result. Moreover, we also ﬁnd that portfolio investment is positive and signiﬁcant
which further supports our story by indicating that more ﬁnancial market integra-
tion with investors holding foreign portfolio assets having the same effects as FDI-
outﬂows. However, the ﬁnding is interesting but not robust given that it only appears
in the GMM regressions. FGLDS in (VIII) also yields comparable results.
4 Conclusion
This paper advances a simple multi-industry trade model a là Dornbusch et al.
(1977) or Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997) with imperfect labor markets due to
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) type of search frictions. Wages in this setup are
jointly determined by labor market institutions and international trade, thereby af-
fecting the equilibrium rate of unemployment at the intensive and extensive margin
of labor demand. This two-dimensional causality between foreign direct invest-
ments and wages (unemployment) also permits the study of changes in the ex-
ogenously given labor market institutional environment. Institutions itself remain
unaffected by ﬁrm behavior or trade so that wages are set according to the con-
ditions in the labor market. Conversely, policy makers may inﬂuence labor market
outcomes by readjusting labor market institutions. The model proposed above sug-
gests that such a reform would necessarily affect trade, wages and unemployment
in all countries integrated through trade in goods and capital.
The paper’s major contribution is to test and to quantify the opposing effects at
the intensive and extensive margin of labor demand by confronting the model with
data taken from the OECD. We successfully test the main hypothesis derived in the
theory chapter in that we show that the FDI-receiving countries tend to have lower
rates of unemployment, whereas an increase in FDI-outﬂows increase equilibrium
unemployment.
The newly introduced Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) search and matching mech-
anism within the Feenstra and Hanson model also opens a novel channel through
which changes in the workers’ wage rate initiated by changes in labor market re-
forms induce capital ﬂows between the integrated countries. For exogenous in-
terest rates, a loss in competitiveness due to the labor market reform would lead
IAB-Discussion Paper 04/2012 20to excess capital supply in the contracting and excess-demand in the expanding
country.
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5.1 Data description
Unemployment rates: For our OECD benchmark regressions we use total un-
employment, measuring the percentage share of unemployed workers in total labor
force (15 - 66 years old individuals). Data taken from Bassanini and Duval. Orig-
inal Source: OECD, Database on Labour Force Statistics; OECD, Annual Labour
Force Statistics.
FDI measures: FDI-net is measured as difference between inward-FDI and outward-
FDI relative to GDP. FDI is taken form the UNCDAT data base and includes trans-
actions of ﬁrms from foreign countries with a share of at least 10% in a domestic
company. FDI stocks and ﬂows are measured in current U.S. Dollar so that real
GDP from the Penn World Table 6.4 was used to construct FDI-net intensities.
Inward-FDI are investments from abroad into the reporting country. FDI-outﬂows
denotes FDI from the reporting country to other countries.
Replacement rate: Average unemployment beneﬁts taken from the Bassanini
and Duval data set. Original source: OECD Beneﬁts and Wages Database. Ac-
cording to Bassanini and Duval data is available for odd years only, so that they
had to ﬁll the gaps by linear interpolation.
Tax wedge: This variable measures taxation on wages by computing the differ-
ence between wages paid by employers and wages earned by employees. The
variable on tax wedge is constructed using the OECD taxing wages data. Some
observations were adjusted by B&D in order to ﬁll the gaps in the data, thus pro-
viding a complete sample for the period 1982 - 2003.
Union density: Union density measures the percentage share of workers associ-
ated to unions. According to B&D the data was taken from the OECD Employment
Outlook 2004 and inter / extrapolated in order to maximize the sample.
High corporatism: Dummy variable that takes the value one if wage bargaining
is highly centralized. Source: Bassanini and Duval.
EPL: Measures the stringency of employment protection legislation, taken from
Bassanini and Duval. Original source: OECD, Employment Outlook 2004.
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Bassanini and Duval. Original source: Conway et al. (2006).
Total factor productivity shock: a macroeconomic shock variable that mea-
sures the derivation of total factor productivity from its trend using a Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁlter. Data on TFP is obtained by computing the Solow residual. Source: Bassanini
and Duval.
Terms of trade shock: Terms of trade measure the relative price of imports
weighted by the share of imports in GDP.
Real interest shock: Measure of the difference between the 10-year nominal
government bond yield and the annual change in the GDP deﬂator.
Labour demand shocks: Deﬁnition: logarithm of the labor share in business
sector GDP purged from the short-run inﬂuence of factor prices.
Output gap: Output gap measures the difference between actual and potential
GDP as percentage of potential output. As source B&D cite the OECD Economic
outlook and IMF International ﬁnance statistics.
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—————————————————— ——————————————————
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Unemployment 8.028 4.460 Unemployment 7.056 3.827
(total) (total)
FDI-net stocks −1.065 15.718 FDI-net stocks −0.205 20.580
(FDI-in minus FDI-out) (FDI-in minus FDI-out)
Wage distortion 58.234 18.499 Wage distortion 58.213 17.835
(replace. r. + tax wedge) (replace. r. + tax wedge)
Replacement rate 29.175 13.090 Replacement rate 28.403 12.73
(index) (index)
Tax wedge 29.058 9.026 Tax wedge 28.712 8.928
(index) (index)
Union density 39.577 21.019 Union density 41.653 20.301
(index) (index)
High corporatism 0.557 0.497 High corporatism 0.561 0.486
(dummy) (dummy)
EPL 2.026 1.058 EPL 2.086 1.091
(index) (index)
PMR 3.875 1.236 PMR 3.848 1.293
(index) (index)
Output gap −0.899 2.473 Output gap −0.718 1.739
(actual - potential GDP) (actual - potential GDP)
TFP −0.0004 0.021 TFP −0.0009 0.011
(shock) (shock)
Interest rate 4.873 2.183 Interest rate 3.534 2.834
(shock) (shock)
Labor demand 0.0301 0.059 Labor demand 0.025 0.060
(shock) (shock)
Terms of trade −0.039 0.062 Terms of trade −0.028 0.070
(shock) (shock)
1
Table 3: Summary statistic
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Proof of Lemma 1. The labor market equilibrium can be characterized by stan-
dard Bellman equations as shown in Pissarides (2000) or Dutt et al. (2010). After
solving for the so-called Wage and Job Creation curves that describe the problem
of the worker and the (small) ﬁrm one can solve for the equilibrium market tightness
by interacting both. This allows us to express the intermediate good prices as func-
tions of exogenous labor market parameters and the equilibrium market tightness,
.
Both, the ﬁnal good’s prices and the intermediate goods prices are interdepen-
dent. The small intermediate goods producers produce under perfect competition
and support their goods to the ﬁnal good assemblers. The small ﬁrm assumption
implies that each ﬁrm recruits one worker and produces exactly one unit of the
intermediate good.
Intermediate good producers have to post vacancies in order to recruit new work-
ers which incurs additional vacancy posting cost. The matching itself can be mod-
eled employing a standard Cobb-Douglas matching function m(), which satisﬁes
m0() < 0.
Job Creation J denotes the present discounted value of expected proﬁt from an
occupied job in skill group k. The value of a vacant job is denoted by V . V depends
on vacancy posting costs (c evaluated at a common price p) and the difference
between the value of taking the job and the opportunity costs of ﬁlling the job.
The value generated by a successful match is revenue of the intermediate good
producer minus variable production cost. The value of the job can be destroyed by
an exogenous shock, , that hits the ﬁrm with poisson arrival rate .
V =  cp + m()(J   V ) (15)
J = %(z)   w   J (16)
Optimal vacancy posting by the ﬁrm implies that the value of vacancies V is zero
in equilibrium.
J =
cp
m()
(17)
Interaction of both equilibrium conditions yields the Job Creation condition
%(z)   w  
cp
m()
( + ) = 0 ; (18)
which states that revenue equals variable production and recruitment costs. It
will be shown that all intermediate good producers pay the same wage to the ho-
mogeneous workers. Final good producers however do differ with respect to unit
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producing in different industries.
Wage Curve From a worker perspective, the job is worth the wage received as
compensation for her effort minus the opportunity cost of forgone outside opportu-
nities. However, the ﬁrm a worker is employed for can be destroyed with a certain
probability. The value of the job will be destroyed so that the worker is left with her
outside option, which is worth U. This outside option comprise unemployment
beneﬁts b and the value of a successful reemployment.
W = w   (W   U) (19)
U = b + m(h)(W
e   U) (20)
W e is expected value of a job. By introducing W e we take into account that workers
are randomly matched to ﬁrms and therefore have to build expectations about W.
This also implies that all ﬁrms pay the same wage rate and therefore only differ
with respect to their production given the equilibrium wage. See Dutt et al. (2009)
for further discussion.
Wages itself are bargained and satisfy
W   U = (J + W   V   U) (21)
This implies
w = U + (%(z)   rU) (22)
and
U = b +

1   
cp (23)
In the end we obtain an aggregate wage equation
w = (1   )b + cp + %(z) (24)
Which is the pendant to the labor supply curve in the standard Feenstra and Han-
son model.
To solve for the job creation curve equation (17) and (16) are combined so that
( + )
cp
m()
= %(z)   w (25)
which can be rearranged to equation (18). To solve for the wage curve we start
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W   U =

1   
J (26)
where we can substitute for J using equation (16)
( + )J = %(z)   w (27)
(28)
Rearranging equation (19)
( + )(W   U) = w + U   ( + )(U) (29)
( + )(W   U) = w   U (30)
The outside option is obtained by solving equation (20)
U = b + m()

1   
cp
m()
(31)
Combining equation (26), (29), and (30) gives
( + )

1   
J = w   U (32)
( + )

1   
%(z)   w
 + 
= w   U (33)
( + )

1   
%(z)   w
 + 
= w   b   m()

1   
cp
m()
(34)
%(z)   w = (1   )w   (1   )b   cp (35)
w = (1   )b + (%(z) + cp) (36)
To solve for the equilibrium intermediate good price we can interact the wage curve
(24) and the job creation curve (18) and solve for %(z)
(1   )b + (%(z) + cp) = %(z)   ( + )
cp
m()
(37)
%(z) = b +
cp
1   

 +
 + 
m()

(38)
Equilibrium on the intermediate producer level. In equilibrium, the wage and
the equilibrium market tightness  are determined by interacting the wage curve
and the job creation curve such that
(1   )b + cp + %(z) = %(z)  
cp
m()
( + ) : (39)
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%(z) =

b +
cp
1   

 +
 + 
m()

: (40)
We can substitute the common price index by qi due to the assumption that vacancy
posting costs are paid in terms of the intermediate good. Moreover, due to perfect
competition and the small ﬁrm assumption, the intermediate good producer’s rev-
enue must equal the price paid by the ﬁnal good producers so that %(z) = qi must
hold in equilibrium. Therefore, all ﬁnal good assemblers pay the same price for
intermediate goods denoted q(z) so that q(z0) = qh(z00) for z0 6= z00. Prices only
depend on exogenous parameters and the equilibrium market tightness, which is
common to all ﬁrms in all industries.
Proof of Lemma 2. First, notice that the left hand of the LMC curve  L is well
behaved due to the convexity of the Beveridge curve. For lim!1 L = L since
lim!1u() = 0. Let the equilibrium market tightness go to zero and we ﬁnd that
lim!0 L = 0 since lim!0u() = 1. Thus, for  = 0 we have full unemployment
and no worker is willing to search for a job.
The right hand side of the LMC curve is also well behaved. Demand for inter-
mediates hinges on the intermediate goods prices q and q depends on exogenous
parameters and the equilibrium market tightness. However, equation (39) is asymp-
totic in  so that the necessary restriction for  is
 +
 + 
m()
<
(1   )
c
to secure that q() > 0. However, this is not a strong assumption for reasonable
values of the exogenous parameters as shown in the calibration section. The ﬁrst
derivative of equation (39) is positive since
@q()
@
=  
 c[ + ( + )m 1](1   )b
h
(1   )   c( +
+
m())
i2 > 0
which is needed to derive
@ R
@ < 0. It is enough to apply the Leibnitz rule on  R in
order to derive
@ R
@q
=
Z  zd
z
¯
d
 '(z)E(qd())
 2dz < 0 (41)
which implies that
@ R
@ < 0. To derive this proof the assumption that the upper and
the lower bound remain constant.
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of  R with respect to z. Notice, that for each country we ex-ante know whether
z is the upper or lower bound. In the two country scenario both countries have
one constant bound (either 0 or 1) and one variable bound z. So it is important to
determine whether z is the upper or lower bound for each country, which depends
on the regarded country’s comparative advantage. For the moment we assume
that home has a comparative advantage in the production of goods closer to 0
and foreign has a comparative advantage in the production of goods closer to 1,
determined by the assumption about the exogenously given technology a(z) where
we assume that ad(1) > af(1) and ad(0) < af(0). For the home country z is
therefore the lower bound of active industries. Changing the bounds and deriving
the ﬁrst derivative with respect to z therefore yields
@ R
@z =  
'(z)E
qi
> 0 (42)
for the FDI-receiving home country and
@ R
@z =
'(z)E
qi
< 0 (43)
for the FDI-sending foreign country. An increase in the cutoff industry thus reduces
labor demand at the extensive margin due to a reduction in active industries.
The second part follows from Lemma 2, which is necessary to proof Proposition
(1). The assumption that interest rates are endogenously determined implies that
capital ﬂows must be compensated by a change in interest rates. Capital outﬂows
for instance makes capital more scarce. The reduction in supply therefore must
be compensated by a readjustment in capital cost. Suppose that everything else
remains equal for the moment. Such an increase in capital cost shifts the unit
cost curves upward. The reverse applies for the capital inﬂow country where the
increases capital supply will shift the unit cost curves downward. The former cutoff
z cannot be optimal anymore and must change. The capital outﬂow country loose
its comparative advantage in some industries close to the former cutoff and the
capital inﬂow country will extend its production to industries formerly associated
to the outﬂow country and z will readjust. Proposition 1 immediately implies that
 R in the outﬂow country will fall and  L in the inﬂow country will rise. To restore
equilibrium, wages and thus unemployment have to readjust so that  L =  R again.
Wages and thus intermediate good prices in the outﬂow country must decrease and
wages in the inﬂow country must increase.
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